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When incentives backfire: Spillover effects in food choice 
by Manuela Angelucci, Silvia Prina, Heather Royer, and Anya Samek* 
Little is known about how peers influence the impact of incentives. We investigate two 
mechanisms by which these effects can occur: through peers’ actions and peers’ incentives. 
In a field experiment on snack choice in the school lunchroom (choice of grapes versus 
cookies), we randomize who receives incentives, the fraction of peers incentivized, and 
whether or not it can be observed that peers’ choices are incentivized. We show that, while 
peers’ actions – picking grapes – have a positive spillover effect on children’s take-up of 
grapes, seeing that peers are incentivized to pick grapes has a negative spillover effect on 
take-up. When incentivized choices are public, incentivizing all children to pick grapes has 
no statistically significant effect on take-up, as the negative spillover offsets the positive 
impacts of incentives on take-up. 
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1 Introduction
Incentives are a cornerstone of economics. As such, their use is frequent in many domains,
including education, health, pro-social behavior, and the labor market.1 While often being
successful at improving behaviors or outcomes, incentives can backfire. This is because incentives
can act as both prices and signals. While the price effect of a higher incentive increases take-up,
the signaling effect may increase or decrease take-up.
For example, incentives can signal about the difficulty of the task (Be´nabou & Tirole, 2003)
or the quality of the good incentivized (e.g., Nelson (1970); Shapiro (1983); Milgrom & Roberts
(1986)), may make a subject feel controlled (deCharms, 1968) or, more broadly, convey “bad
news” (Gneezy et al. , 2011). Consistent with this signaling theory, Gneezy & Rustichini (2000)
find in two separate experiments that performance on a task falls when small monetary incentives
are offered, compared to offering no incentives. Fischer et al. (2014) find that the subsequent
demand for various products decreases with their introductory price.2
A limitation of the literature on the signalling effects of incentives is that it focuses on the
effects of incentives on their recipients (the direct effects), neglecting the spillover effects of
incentives.3 For example, consider paying students to choose a healthy snack at school. The
direct effect of the incentive program, absent the influence of peers, may result in students
eating more of the healthy snack. At the same time, these incentives can cause two types of
spillover effects. One spillover effect operates through observing peers’ actions and a second
works through observing peers’ incentives. If I see my friends pick the healthy snack, I may
think that this snack is delicious and healthy. However, if I see my friends incentivized to choose
this snack, I may think that it is not tasty (and thus, why it was incentivized). These two
spillover effects are not necessarily of the same sign or size, as their magnitudes may vary with
how many of my friends are incentivized.
In sum, when we observe that incentivizing children’s choice of a healthy snack affects their
eating behavior, we are observing a combination of (i) the direct effect of incentives – paying
a child to pick a healthy snack, (ii) the effect of peers’ action – changing peers’ choice of the
1A not nearly-exhaustive list of these studies include Volpp et al. (2008, 2009); Charness & Gneezy (2009);
Acland & Levy (2015); Babcock & Hartman (2010); Babcock et al. (2015); Cawley & Price (2013); John et al.
(2011); Royer et al. (2015); Belot et al. (2013); List & Samek (2014, 2015); Loewenstein et al. (2016) for
healthy behaviors, Angrist et al. (2009); Bettinger (2012); Fryer Jr (2011); Levitt et al. (2011b,a) for academic
achievement, Ariely et al. (2009); Lacetera & Macis (2010); Lacetera et al. (2013) for pro-social behavior, and
Gneezy & List (2006); Fehr & List (2004); Bandiera et al. (2013); Shearer (2004) for worker effort.
2See Deci et al. (1999) for a meta analysis of the evidence from psychology and Gneezy et al. (2011) and
Kamenica (2012) for evidence from economics.
3Following the taxonomy of Angelucci & Di Maro (2016), we define spillover effects in this paper as peer social
interaction effects.
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healthy snack, and (iii) the effect of peers’ incentives – watching that peers are incentivized
to pick the healthy snack. Moreover, three implications of considering the signalling effects of
incentives are 1) these spillover effects are of indeterminate sign, 2) the overall effect (i.e., the
sum of the direct and spillover effects) may differ from the direct effect, and 3) the overall effect
may vary with the fraction of peers incentivized, if each spillover effect is non-linear with respect
to the fraction incentivized.
The goal of this paper is to study the impact of incentives through peers’ actions and peers’
incentive status and, specifically, to test whether spillover effects can undo the direct effect of
incentives. To do that, we sketch a simple model and test its predictions by designing and
conducting a field experiment that lets us measure the total effect of incentives and decompose
it into its direct effect and its spillover effects. We offer grapes and cookies and incentivize
the choice of grapes versus cookies of 1,600 children in grades K-8 in a low-income Chicago
neighborhood. Almost a third of US children aged 2-19 are now deemed overweight or obese,
and part of the problem is the habitual decision to consume high calorie, low nutrient foods
(Ogden et al. , 2010). Thus, incentivizing the choice of healthy food may be one policy tool to
reduce the rates of overweight and obesity.
This experiment is uniquely designed to both measure the total effect of incentives and
decompose this total effect into the direct effect of incentives and the spillover effects of incentives
that occur through peers’ action and incentives. To do so, the experiment has two stages. In
stage 1, children choose grapes or a cookie simultaneously, without observing their peers’ choices.
We define their peers in this case as other children sitting at their lunch room table. In stage
2, we allow children to switch their snack of choice after observing peers’ initial choices and, in
some cases, peers’ incentive status. We call the stage 1 decision the direct effect of incentives,
because this choice is unaffected by peers’ actions and incentive status, unlike the choice in stage
2, which encompasses direct and spillover effects.
To identify the direct effect of incentives, we randomize who is incentivized to choose grapes.
To separate the spillover effects of peers’ actions from the spillover effects of peers’ incentive
status, we randomize both the fraction incentivized at each table and whether a student’s choice
of incentivized grapes is public knowledge (our public treatment). Randomizing the fraction of
tablemates incentivized allows us to identify the spillover effects under weaker assumptions than
much of the prior literature.4
4As summarized by Baird et al. (2014), the previous literature identifies spillover effects by not treating some
group members (e.g., Angelucci & De Giorgi (2009); Barrera-Osorio et al. (2011); Bobonis & Finan (2009); Duflo
& Saez (2003); Lalive & Cattaneo (2009); Guiteras et al. (2015)), by using plausible exogenous variation in the
fractions of peers treated (e.g., Babcock & Hartman (2010); Beaman (2012); Conley & Udry (2010); Duflo & Saez
(2002); Munshi (2003)), and by looking at differential treatment effects within a predetermined peer group (e.g.,
3
Our main finding is that, in the public treatment, incentivizing all children has no statistically
significant effect on grape take-up relative to incentivizing no children. The direct effect of
incentives is positive - meaning that take-up of grapes is initially higher in the 100% incentivized
tables before observing peers’ behaviors. However, after observing that all children who chose
grapes were incentivized to do so, some children in the 100% incentivized tables switch from
grapes to cookie. This degree of switching does not occur in tables in which all children are
incentivized and incentives are private. Using the random variation in the fraction of children
incentivized (i.e., not just comparing the 0% and 100% incentivized tables), we show that, at
least in the case we consider, there are non-linear spillover effects of incentives with respect to
the fraction incentivized in the public treatment: the overall effect of incentives is positive when
we incentivize up to two thirds of children, while it becomes statistically indistinguishable from
zero when we incentivize all children. Conversely, the spillover effects are positive in the private
treatment, in which the incentive status of other is not visible, for all fractions of incentivized
children.
Imagine that our experiment consisted of stage 1 only, that is, we randomly offered incentives
and we forced the choice to occur simultaneously. If we had done this, we would have measured
the direct effects only, and concluded that incentives have a strong positive effect on the take-
up of grapes, while, in fact, this is not always the case. Similarly, imagine that we had not
separated stages 1 and 2 and compared the final grape take-up in tables with 0 and 100% of
children incentivized. In that case, we would not have been able to separate the direct and
the spillover effects of incentives and may have concluded that our subjects do not respond to
our incentives, while, in fact, they do, but in offsetting ways. Lastly, if we had not let the
fraction of children incentivized vary across tables, we would not have been able to measure the
non-monotonicity in the spillover effects of incentives.
We also consider other candidate explanations for our findings. We rule out that the effects
of peers’ incentives are driven by envy or fairness issues because the largest spillover effect occurs
in tables in which all children are incentivized, and, therefore, children are not changing their
snack because they feel unfairly treated or envious of their incentivized peers. Our results are
also inconsistent with models of conformity where there is a desire to conform differently to
one’s best friends, popular kids, or kids of the same gender than to other types of children.
Our findings have three broad implications. First, to understand the full impact of incentives,
one should design experiments to capture spillover effects. Ignoring the spillover effects might
result in imprecise policy recommendations because the direct and spillover effects could possibly
Banerjee et al. (2013); Chen et al. (2010); Macours & Vakis (2008); Neumark-Sztainer et al. (2012)).
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offset one another. For example, in our experiment, the direct effect of incentives can be larger
than the overall effect of incentives, when incentives are public.
Second, the presence of non-monotonicities with respect to the fraction incentivized makes
extrapolation and policy scale-up from field experiments challenging. The existence of “social
multipliers” (Glaeser et al. , 2003) is well known. However, the implicit assumption – backed by
abundant empirical evidence – is that the multiplier is monotonic and that, therefore, the direct
effect of incentives is a lower bound of its net effect (in absolute level).5 This is not the case
in our setting, since the overall effect of incentives in the public treatment is positive when we
incentivize up to around two thirds of table mates, but zero when we incentivize all subjects.
The existence of these non-linearities implies that field experiments incentivizing different
fractions of the subject pool may come to very different conclusions about the effects of the
same type of incentive. For example, consider the effect of PROGRESA’s conditional cash
transfers for human capital accumulation. These transfers were given to about 75% of the
population in treated villages, and have been shown to have positive direct and spillover effects
on school enrollment (Angelucci et al. , 2010; Bobonis & Finan, 2009; Lalive & Cattaneo, 2009).
If the spillover effects vary non-monotonically with the fraction of the treated population, the
estimated effects in the evaluation villages may differ in both sign and magnitude from the effect
at the national level, because different fractions of the population are treated after the program
is rolled out.
Third, if observing others’ incentive status reduces take-up, private incentives may be prefer-
able. This may not be feasible in most settings, as people communicate and interact.
One should be cautious in generalizing our results. Different settings or populations may
lead to different spillover effects of incentives. The main conclusion of this paper, nevertheless,
remains valid (and valuable): spillover effects can undo the direct effect of incentives. Further
research should study whether different designs and contexts deliver similar results.
This caveat notwithstanding, we believe that evaluating the spillover effects of incentives
may be worthwhile in several settings. The first type of setting is one in which the value of
the incentivized action is not well known and in which subjects believe peers and policy makers
may have private information (e.g., new technology adoption). In such settings, incentives
allow subjects to learn from peers’ and policymakers’ actions. However, as the signalling effects
of incentives can be both negative and positive, careful consideration should be made when
invoking incentive schemes for public policy. For example, the Physician Payment Sunshine
5Examples include the take-up of welfare (Borjas & Hilton, 1996; Bertrand et al. , 2000), employer-sponsored
health insurance (Sorensen, 2006), retirement plans (Duflo & Saez, 2003), public prenatal care (Aizer & Currie,
2004), disability insurance (Rege et al. , 2009) and movie attendance (Moretti, 2011), among others.
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Act, which requires drug manufacturers to disclose certain payments to physicians, may reduce
the demand for drugs from the paying manufacturers, if the payments are perceived to signal
that the drugs of a given manufacturer are not as effective as others. The second type of
setting is one in which the incentivized behavior has short-run costs but long-run benefits (e.g.,
nutrition, exercise, education, and other behaviors that increase health and human capital).6
In this case, the incentive may increase the salience of the short-term cost over the long-term
benefit of the incentivized action. The third type of setting is in pro-social behaviors, such as
recycling, charitable giving, or blood donation, whose ‘warm-glow’ value exceeds the monetary
value of incentives (see, e.g., Frey & Oberholzer-Gee (1997)). Finally, the fourth possible setting
is in interesting or pleasant activities, where incentives may reduce interest in the task.7
2 Theory
Before discussing the experiment, we present a simple model to demonstrate both positive and
negative direct and spillover effects of incentives can plausibly exist, in the spirit of Be´nabou
& Tirole (2003). Be´nabou & Tirole (2003) model the behavior of a principal, who has private
information on the attributes of an action (e.g., how pleasant or difficult it is), and an agent, who
is uncertain about the net benefit of undertaking the action and who is aware of this asymmetric
information. The principal incentivizes the action in a way related to its cost for the agent. The
agent is affected by the incentive in two opposite ways: the incentive increases the benefit of
undertaking the action; however, it also provides the agent with a signal about the cost of
undertaking the action. Since high incentives may signal a costly action, principals uncertain
about the signaling effect of the incentive may set incentives that reduce the likelihood that the
agent will undertake the action, as they increase the benefit from undertaking the action less
than they increase its cost.
We extend this model to consider how, in addition to these direct effects of incentives,
incentivizing an action affects the agent’s behavior also by changing the actions and incentive
status of the agent’s peers.
Consider the choice of grapes, Gi = 1, versus cookies, Gi = 0, for child i in a setting with
asymmetric information. The child decides to pick grapes over cookies if the expected private
benefits of this choice exceed its costs. The monetary (or cash-equivalent) cost of choosing grapes
over cookies, C, is a function of incentives, I. The child’s beliefs of the benefits, Bi, depend
on her idiosyncratic taste, τi, as well as on the behavior of her peers and of the experimenter,
6Gneezy et al. (2011) review the evidence of incentives backfiring in this type of setting.
7Kamenica (2012) review the evidence of incentives backfiring for the last two settings.
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whom the child believes to have private information about the relative value of grapes over
cookies, such as their relative health benefits and taste. The child observes the behavior of her
peers and of the experimenter to infer their private information. This setting does not require
the experimenter and peers to have more or better information than the child. However, it
does require that the private information of the experimenter and peers be complementary to
the child’s information, so that observing peers’ actions and incentives can lead to changes in
the child’s belief. For example, in our empirical setting, cookies are not typically part of the
lunch menu, so some children may not know how good the offered cookies taste. Moreover, the
experimenter may have seen other children make this choice before, and, therefore, be expected
to have information about children’s relative preferences over the snacks.
The child observes a signal of the private information of her peers and of the experimenter
from their actions. In our experiment, she observes i) the fraction of her peers who choose
grapes over cookies, G¯−i, ii) the fraction of her peers who choose incentivized grapes, I¯−i, and
iii) whether she is incentivized to pick grapes, I. I¯−i is a lower bound of the fraction of peers
who were incentivized to choose grapes, TP . The main goal of our experiment which we detail
later is to distinguish spillover behavior due to responses to the fraction of peers who choose
grapes (i.e., spillover effects due to peers’ choices) versus responses due to the fraction choosing
incentivized grapes (i.e., spillover effects due to peers’ incentive status). In sum, the expected
utility of choosing grapes over cookies can be expressed as:
E[U(Gi = 1)− U(Gi = 0)] = Bi(τi, G¯−i(TP ), I¯−i(TP ), I)− C(I) (1)
2.1 Direct Effect of Incentives
Consider first the direct effect of incentives,8 I on the incentivized person:








The first right-hand side term, ∂Bi∂I , is the effect of introducing (or increasing) the incentive
on the child’s belief on the relative value of grapes over cookies. The sign of this effect is
indeterminate. For example, in Be´nabou & Tirole (2003), being incentivized (or having a higher-
valued incentive) signals “bad news” – e.g., that the experimenter and the other children perceive
grapes to be unpopular or unpleasant.9 This may make her revise her prior beliefs about the
8Note the direct effect we model allows for peer influences. For example, a child may initially choose cookies
because she wants to be popular.
9In Be´nabou & Tirole (2003), a principal has private information about attractiveness of an action and may
offer larger incentives for less attractive tasks. The agent, therefore, expects larger incentives to signal more
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benefits of grapes downward. On the other hand, the incentive may signal that the experimenter
thinks grapes are really good for the child (maybe despite not tasting as good as the cookie),
inducing her to revise her prior belief of the benefits of grapes upward.
Conversely, the second right-hand side term, ∂C∂I , which represents the effect of the incentives
on cost, is negative, as compensating the child to pick grapes over cookies reduces its cost. In
sum, the sign of the direct effect is unknown, due to the ambiguity of the sign of ∂Bi∂I .
2.2 Spillover Effects of Incentives
Now consider the effect of the fraction incentivized. This is what we call the spillover effect. To
do that, consider an increase in the proportion of children who are incentivized to pick grapes,
TP , which affects the fraction of her peers who initially choose grapes over cookies, G¯−i, and
who initially choose incentivized grapes, I¯−i.













The first right-hand side term, ∂Bi
∂G¯−i
∂G¯−i
∂TP , is the spillover effect of incentives through watching
others pick grapes and has an indeterminate sign. The sign of ∂Bi
∂G¯−i
is positive, if an increase
in the proportion picking grapes sends a positive signal about the value of grapes.10 Therefore,
the sign of this first term depends on how increasing the proportion incentivized affects the
proportion picking grapes initially, ∂G¯−i∂TP . This has the same sign as the direct effect of incentives.
The second right-hand side term, ∂Bi
∂I¯−i
∂I¯−i
∂TP , is the spillover effect of incentives through watch-
ing others pick incentivized grapes. It has an indeterminate sign because the signs of its two
parts are both indeterminate. The sign of ∂Bi
∂I¯−i
depends on how children interpret the experi-
menter’s intent to incentivize children to pick grapes and, therefore, has the same sign as ∂Bi∂I .
∂I¯−i
∂TP has the same sign as the direct effect. Overall, taking into account the spillover effects and
their possible signs (detailed below), the sign of the overall effect of incentives can be ambiguous.
There are, therefore, the following 3 cases, also summarized in Table 1:
Case 1: Incentives send a weakly positive signal on the value of grapes (∂Bi∂I ≥ 0). When
this happens, the direct effect of incentives is positive, as ∂Bi∂I − ∂C(I)∂I > 0. If the direct effect is
positive, then increasing the proportion incentivized increases the proportion choosing grapes,
incentivized or not, (∂G¯−i∂TP > 0 and
∂I¯−i
∂TP > 0). Moreover, if the incentive sends a weakly positive
unpleasant tasks and may be less motivated to do it.
10The sign of ∂Bi
∂G¯−i
can also be negative. We do not explicitly model this option because it would increase the
number of possible cases, and thus lengthen the exposition, without adding to our main point that the direct and
spillover effects may have opposite signs. Moreover, the sign of ∂Bi
∂G¯−i
is positive in our data, so modelling this
option is not essential in this application.
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signal on value of grapes, then the belief of the value of grapes grows with the proportion
of children choosing incentivized grapes, ∂Bi
∂I¯−i
≥ 0, and, therefore, the two spillover effects of
incentives are also positive. That is, in this case the spillover effects through peers’ actions and
incentive status reinforce the direct effects.
Case 2: Incentives send a negative signal on the value of grapes (∂Bi∂I < 0), but the direct
effect is positive, because the cost reduction more than offsets the negative signal for incentivized
children, ∂Bi∂I <
∂C(I)
∂I . If the incentive sends a negative signal on the value of grapes, the
belief of the value of grapes decreases with the proportion of children choosing incentivized
grapes, ∂Bi
∂I¯−i
< 0. Moreover, if the direct effect is positive, increasing the proportion incentivized
increases the proportion choosing grapes, incentivized or not, (∂G¯−i∂TP > 0 and
∂I¯−i
∂TP > 0). It
follows that the sign of the spillover effect is indeterminate: the first term is positive, the second
negative. That is, in this case the spillover effects may either reinforce or offset the direct effects.
Case 3: Incentives send a negative signal on the value of grapes (∂Bi∂I < 0) and the direct
effect is negative, because the cost reduction is offset by the negative signal for incentivized
children, ∂Bi∂I <
∂C(I)
∂I . If the incentive sends a negative signal on the value of grapes, the belief
of the value of grapes decreases with the proportion of children choosing incentivized grapes,
∂Bi
∂I¯−i
< 0. Moreover, if the direct effect is negative, then increasing the proportion incentivized
reduces the proportion choosing grapes, incentivized or not, (∂G¯−i∂TP < 0 and
∂I¯−i
∂TP < 0). It follows
that the sign of the spillover effects is indeterminate: the first term is negative, the second
positive. That is, in this case the spillover effects may either reinforce or offset the direct effects.
In sum, we have 3 broad conclusions. First, incentives may have both a positive and a
negative direct effect.11 Second, when incentives are “bad news” (∂Bi∂I < 0), the spillover effects
of incentives can have both a positive and negative component. Third, when incentives are “bad
news,” the direct and spillover effects of incentives may offset each other. Therefore, the direct
effect may be a poor approximation of the overall effect of incentives.
Alternative models. A model with symmetric information but with a short term cost and
a long term benefit of choosing grapes over cookies would generate similar predictions, if the
public incentives make the short term cost more prominent and hence reduce the likelihood of
choosing grapes. This would change the mechanisms behind our findings, but not our empirical
setup. Moreover, regardless of whether information is asymmetric or not, incentive salience may
affect behavior. In an environment in which incentives signal “bad news” or emphasize the short
term cost of an action over its long benefits, making incentives more prominent may increase
the perceived cost of an action, thus reducing its take-up. Lastly, a model in which there is both
11In empirical settings such as ours, we cannot separately identify the positive and negative direct effects of
incentive, as we observe only their sum.
9
an intrinsic dislike for incentives, as, e.g., they make subjects feel controlled (deCharms, 1968)
or cause envy or fairness issues (Sherif, 1937; Asch, 1958; Feldman & Kirman, 1974; Fehr &
Schmidt, 1999; Goeree & Yariv, 2014; Haun et al. , 2014) and social conformity to peers’ actions
would have the same set of predictions. Section 9 considers alternative models of behaviors -
social conformity, fairness, and envy. Support for these models is limited in our data.
3 Background and Experimental Design
To measure the direct and spillover effects of incentives, we designed an artefactual field exper-
iment (Harrison & List, 2004) in which we offer grapes and cookies to children and randomly
offer incentives to choose grapes.12 This experiment took place in school cafeterias during lunch.
Nine elementary schools in Chicago Heights, Illinois participated. Lunch is administered in much
the same way in each of these schools. Depending on their size, schools hold either 2, 3 or 4
lunch periods each day, assigning kids to periods based on their school grade. Children arrive
for lunch during their designated lunch period together with their class. They go through a
lunch line where they receive a school lunch and then sit at a table in the cafeteria. Except
for kindergartners, students can typically sit with any other children from their grade and tend
to form groups of 3-10 students at each table. In this school district, children do not have a
choice about their lunch. Moreover, Chicago Heights, Illinois is in a low-income neighborhood
and most children qualify for free or reduced-price lunch, meaning that all kids eat the same
school-provided meal each day. Aside from the current and previous experiment, we are not
aware of specific programs at these schools promoting healthy eating habits.
We conducted the experiment after children had collected their lunch trays and sat down
to eat at their table, as they normally do. Once children chose where to sit, members of the
research team came to the table and read a script, reported in Appendix A, which described
the procedures of the experiment. We treated adjacent tables simultaneously. This, and the
fact that children are required to stay seated at their table throughout the entire lunch period,
minimized cross-table contamination. To ensure compliance, we assigned one research assistant
to one table at a time and ensured that adjacent tables could not easily see what was happening
at nearby tables.
Each child was asked to pick both a grape card (green on the back) and a cookie card (blue on
the back) from a card deck (see Figure 1). To facilitate data collection, each child’s ID number
from the experiment was written on each of his or her cards. Then, each child made a choice:
12Grapes, but not cookies, are sometimes served at lunch.
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he or she could either choose to have grapes as an additional food (by placing the grape/green
card down on the table), or he or she could choose to have cookies as an additional food (by
placing the cookie/blue card down on the table). Children were told that they could choose only
one snack, and that the actual food item they had selected would be delivered to their table
immediately at the end of the experiment. The initial choice was always made simultaneously
and children were asked not to talk during the experiment. All children complied with these
requirements. After the initial choice, children had twenty seconds to play a different card after
having observed their peers’ choices.
We randomized 1) which child received an incentive to choose grapes, 2) the fraction of
each lunch table that received an incentive to select grapes, and 3) in which tables choosing
incentivized grapes are visible by peers (public treatment) or not (private treatment). In par-
ticular, for each table, we had a stack of cards, which had either 0, 50, or 100% of cards with
incentives. At tables with 50% of cards incentivized, because the incentivized cards where ran-
domly stacked in the decks and the number of occupants changes by table, the actual fraction
of children receiving incentives varies between 11 and 80 percent. This variation is seen in Table
2.
In all treatments, children were alerted to the possibility that they may be eligible for a
prize depending on the card they draw, and a poster with all possible prizes was displayed to
the kids. The value of each prize was roughly 50 cents. The prizes included glow-in-the-dark
bouncy balls, small trophies, and bracelets and pens of different types.
If students were eligible for an incentive, their grape card depicted a small gold token. For
the 50 percent incentive treatment, the cards came from a deck where 50 percent of the grape
cards portrayed a gold token. In the 100 percent incentives treatment, all the grapes cards
depicted the coin.
In the private treatment, children play their cards face down, so that children can observe
only the color of the card, but not the presence or absence of the incentives. In the public
treatment, on the other hand, children play their cards face up, so that anyone at the table can
observe whether the chosen grapes are incentivized or not.
With the three levels of randomization, we can divide children into six table types, depending
on (i) whether 0, 50, or 100% of the cards for a table is incentivized, and (ii) whether the
incentivized choices are public or private. If we further group children depending on their
incentive status, we end up with eight groups:
• Private-0 (Group 1): Children in the Private treatment in which none of the grape cards
were incentivized.
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• Public-0 (Group 2): Children in the Public treatment in which none of the grape cards
were incentivized.
• Private-50-no incentive (Group 3): Children in the Private treatment in which 50% of the
grape cards were incentivized but the child’s own card was not incentivized.
• Private-50-incentive (Group 4): Children in the Private treatment in which 50% of the
grape cards were incentivized and the child’s own card was incentivized.
• Public-50-no incentive (Group 5): Children in the Public treatment in which 50% of the
grape cards were incentivized and the child’s own card was not incentivized.
• Public-50-incentive (Group 6): Children in the Public treatment in which 50% of the grape
cards were incentivized and the child’s own card was incentivized.
• Private-100-incentive (Group 7): Children in the Private treatment in which all of the
grape cards were incentivized.
• Public-100-incentive (Group 8): Children in the Public treatment in which all of the grape
cards were incentivized.
We designed the experiment by randomizing each school-by-period table in such a way as to
have one quarter of the school-by-period tables assigned to the 0% and 100% treatments each,
and the remaining half to the the 50% treatment, cross randomizing the public and private
treatment to have half of the school-by-period tables in each group.
We record both the initial food choice, G1, and the final food choice, G2. We use G1 to
measure the direct effect of incentives because this choice occurs simultaneously and before
children can observe their peers’ choices and incentives. We use G2 to measure the spillover
effect of incentives because this final choice occurs after having observed peers’ choices and
incentives.
Our experimental design makes advances in the peer effects literature along 4 dimensions.
First, by recording both initial and final snack choice, we can both measure the overall effect
of incentives and decompose it into the direct and the spillover effects of incentives. The ex-
isting literature typically focuses on measuring either the overall effects, without being able to
decompose them (as in, e.g., Royer et al. (2015)) or the direct effect only, without being able
to study how incentives would affect behavior once spillover effects are allowed to operate (as
in, e.g., Just & Price (2013)).
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Second, by randomly varying the fraction of treated peers and allowing people to switch
snack after observing their peers’ actions and incentives, we can measure spillover effects on
both incentivized and non-incentivized subjects. In many papers that measure spillover effects,
this is not possible unless one is willing to make (potentially unrealistic) assumptions. This
occurs because papers that measure spillover effects typically do so by looking at the effect of
a treatment on untreated subjects. If treated and untreated subjects are randomly selected
(as in, e.g., Duflo & Saez (2003)), the spillover effects on the non-treated are the same as the
spillover effects on the treated under the assumption that these effects are additive, but such
an assumption is not necessarily backed by any theory. If treated and non-treated subjects are
not randomly selected (as in, e.g., Angelucci & De Giorgi (2009)), then the spillover effects on
the non-treated are the same as the spillover effects on the treated under the additional and less
realistic assumption that these effects are homogeneous across different types of subjects.
Third, by randomly varying the fraction of treated peers, we can measure potential non-
linearities in spillover effects. In many papers that measure spillover effects, this variation is not
random. For example, in Babcock & Hartman (2010), some subjects have more treated friends
than others. However, these subjects may also have more friends to begin with, so the variation
in treated friends is not exogenous. Therefore, while these papers can measure the combined
effects of treating different subjects and having different numbers of treated peers, we can isolate
the latter effect under weak identification assumptions.
Fourth, by having private and public treatments, we can separate the spillover effect of peers’
actions (observed both in the private and public treatment) from the spillover effects of peers’
incentives (observed in the public treatment only). To our knowledge, this is the first time such
a decomposition has been done.
4 The data
4.1 Sample
A total of 1,771 children participated in the experiment. We drop 14 tables of 10 from the main
analysis because we do not believe that kids can see all others’ decisions at such a large table.
The results in the next section are qualitatively unchanged if we include tables with 10 children.
We complemented the experimental data with a short survey assessing the social networks
of kids (available upon request). The survey included questions asking children to name up to
5 of their friends. There were also questions about each child’s perceived social status relative
to other children and the most popular kid boy and girl in their class. A total of 1,286 (73%)
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children filled out the questionnaire.
After dropping large tables, our final sample consists of 1,631 children, of whom 1,187 com-
pleted the questionnaire, sitting at 270 school-by-period tables.13
The final size of each of the 8 groups varies because some of the tables in the cafeteria were
empty.
4.2 Descriptives, balance tests, and food choice
Table 3 shows the mean and standard deviations of several socioeconomic variables for each of
the eight groups. Lunch tables have on average 6.45 children of which 47 percent are boys. The
average grade is fourth grade, 39% of children at each table are African American and 52% are
Hispanic, and 87% of the children at each table are on the free lunch program (and some more
qualify for lunch at a reduced price). We test that the variables are balanced across groups in
the lower panel of Table 3, which shows the F-test of joint significance of the 8 group dummies,
when regressed on each of these variables together with school-by-period strata. None of the
F-tests are significant at conventional levels, consistent with random assignment.
We also check for balance using the actual fraction of student incentivized as opposed to
these discrete groups considered in Table 3. Recall, while the grape cards for the 50% incen-
tivized tables were drawn from a deck where half of the cards were incentivized, the actual
fraction incentivized deviated from 50%. We regress the proportion of children incentivized at
each table on table size and children’s age, gender, race, grade, and school lunch status (free,
reduced, or none), as well as on school-by-period strata. The F-test of joint significance of the
coefficients of the socioeconomic variables has a p-value of 0.087. This is driven by a smaller
table proportion incentivized for third and six graders by chance. Once we exclude grade, the
F-test of joint significance of the coefficients of the remaining socioeconomic variables has a p-
value of 0.543. For this purpose, and to improve the precision of the estimates, we control for all
the aforementioned variables in all our specifications. The results are qualitatively unchanged
whether we add these variables or not.
In Table 4, as a first basic look at our results, we examine snack choices across the eight
groups. Two findings are apparent: incentives increase the fraction initially choosing grapes and
between 2 and 10 percent of children revise their initial snack choice. This is our first evidence
of the presence of direct and spillover effects of incentives, which we explore further in detail.
13Non-participation in the survey is also due to a number of reasons: either children were too young, or teachers
overseeing the lunch period asked us not to administer the survey, or not enough time was available for all children
to complete the survey.
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5 Total effect of incentives
Our goal is to estimate the total effect of incentives on grape take-up and to decompose this
total effect into the direct effect of incentives and the spillover effects due to peers’ actions
and incentives. To do that, we first consider the effect on final grape take-up, the variable G2,
which is the sum of the initial grape choice, G1, and the revised choice, ∆G. We then proceed
to estimate the direct effects of incentives using the variable G1 and the spillover effects of
incentives using the variable ∆G.
Figure 2 plots the semi-parametric total effect of table proportion incentivized on a dummy
variable indicating the final choice of grapes, G2, for the private and public treatments.
14 While
the total effect of incentives grows with the table proportion incentivized in the private treatment,
this effect is non-monotonic in the public treatment. In these tables, the total effect of incentives
grows with the proportion incentivized up until about two thirds of children are incentivized,
but it is considerably lower when all children are incentivized, to the degree to which there is
no statistically significant difference in final grapes take-up between tables with 0 and 100%
incentives. Note that, while we have few tables with 60 to 80% incentivized children (hence the
larger confidence intervals), grapes take-up among these tables differs statistically from tables
with both 0% and 100% incentivized children.15
Comparing the public and private treatments suggests that the non-monotonicity in the
public treatment is linked to the observability of incentives, as the effect is monotonic in the
private treatment. Figure 3, which measures the direct effects of incentives, confirms this because
the initial choice of grapes, made before peers’ actions and incentives are observed, grows with
the table proportion incentivized in both public and private treatments.
A comparison of Figures 2 and 3 shows little difference in initial and final grape choice in
the private treatment, consistent with no or modest spillover effects of peers’ actions, but a
reduction from initial to final grape take-up in the public treatment tables where all children are
incentivized, consistent with negative spillover effects of children’s incentive status. The fraction
of children initially picking grapes does not vary in the public and private 100% tables. However,
14To do so, we use the Robinson’s semi-parametric estimator (Robinson, 1988) to control for the effect of the
predetermined covariates (school-by-period strata, table size, child age, gender, race, grade, and school lunch
status) and then smooth the effect of incentive proportion on final grape choice using a local linear regression
with a Gaussian kernel and a rule-of-thumb bandwidth. The results are robust to changes in the kernel and
bandwidth, as well as to using the table, rather than the child, as the unit of analysis. We cluster the standard
errors by table. We report the 83% confidence intervals because, if the 83% confidence intervals around two point
estimates do not overlap, the parameters are statistically different from each other at the 95% level (Peyton et al.
, 2003). We use the same empirical approach also for the next two figures.
15Comparing group means reinforces our main findings that the final grape take-up increases with the propor-
tion of incentivized children in the private treatment but not in the public treatment.
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in the public tables, children can additionally see that all their peers who picked grapes were
incentivized to do so. Therefore, when we observe fewer children ending up picking grapes (more
children switch from grape to cookie and fewer children switch from cookie to grape in public
than private tables), we can deduce that this difference is caused by observing peers’ incentive
status.
Lastly, the initial choice of grapes is lower in the public than the private treatment, including
in tables where no child is incentivized, consistent with the idea that making incentives more
salient may signal “bad news” (e.g., Gneezy et al. (2011)) or make the short term costs of
picking grapes over a cookie more prominent.
To conclude, these figures provide evidence of direct and spillover effects of incentives of
opposite signs in the public treatment. The lack of a statistically significant difference in take-
up between the 0% and the 100% public tables does not mean that children in our sample
do not respond to the incentives. Incentivizing approximately 50 to 70% of children increases
final take-up by around 10-30 percentage points, but this gap shrinks and eventually is no
longer statistically different from zero when all children receive incentives. Thus, these initial
findings show that, in our experiment, public incentives backfire, but only when all children are
incentivized to pick grapes. Our next step is to decompose the total effect of incentives into its
direct effect and the spillover effects to study their sign and magnitude.
6 Direct effects of incentives
We measure the direct effect of incentives on grape choice, that is, whether receiving the in-
centives changes the recipients’ likelihood of initially choosing grapes, by comparing the initial
grape choice of incentivized and non-incentivized children. To do so, we regress child i’s initial
grape choice, G1, on a dummy variable, I, that equals 1 for children who receive incentives
and 0 otherwise. To improve the precision of the estimates, we condition on the variables X:
school-by-period strata, table size, child age, gender, race, grade, and school lunch status.
G1i = α0 + α1Ii + α2Xi + i (4)
The coefficient α1 identifies the average treatment effect of incentives on initial grape choice.
This parameter is identified under the assumptions that (i) the variable I and the error term
 are independent, which follows from random assignment, and that (ii) one child’s potential
outcomes are unaffected by the treatment status of others, which follows by keeping treatment
status private at this stage. We estimate the parameters of this equation by OLS, clustering
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the standard errors by table. We use the same estimator, controls, and clustering for all the
regressions in this paper.
We can also interact the incentive dummy by a dummy for the public (P = 1) and private
(P = 0) treatments:
G1i = λ0 + λ1Ii + λ2Pi + λ3IiPi + λ4Xi + i (5)
This way, we can test i) whether the direct effects of incentives are identical in the public and
private treatment (λ3 = 0) and ii) whether the initial grape choice is identical in the public and
private treatments for non-incentivized children (λ2 = 0) and incentivized children (λ2+λ3 = 0).
Column (1) of Table 5 shows the direct effects of incentives on the initial choice of incentivized
children (the estimate of α1 from equation (4)). Incentives increase initial grape take-up by 26
percentage points, a statistically significant increase of about 53%, compared to a 49.5% take-up
rate among non-incentivized children.
These findings are comparable in size to Just & Price (2013), who increase children’s con-
sumption of salad by 80% after offering up to $0.25 (or a lottery ticket with the same expected
value), and smaller, but consistent, with List & Samek (2014, 2015), whose incentives have a
two- to four-fold increase in the choice of healthy snacks. Conversely, our effects are larger than
the ones in Belot et al. (2013), whose piece-rate incentives to choose an extra vegetables side
dish have a small, statistically insignificant effect.
A child’s initial choice may depend on whether others can observe her incentive status. Recall
that in the private treatment, the cards are played face down and, therefore, one can infer other
children’s choices from the color of the card, but not whether a child was incentivized. On
the other hand, for the public treatment, the cards are played face up and the incentives can
be observed. To test whether children behave differently when they know others can observe
whether or not they are incentivized, the second row of Table 5 in column (2) provides the
estimate of the difference in effect sizes in the public and private treatment (the estimate of λ2
from equation (5)). This difference is only 0.013 and is statistically insignificant.
The third and fourth rows of the tables show that the initial grape choice is 8.4 and 7.1
percentage points lower in public treatments for both non-incentivized and incentivized children
(the estimates of λ2 and λ2+λ3 from equation (5)), as we already noticed in the previous section.
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7 Spillover effects of incentives
Finding positive direct effects of incentives rules out case 3 (negative direct effects of incentives)
and is compatible with both cases 1 and 2 from our theory: peers’ action (choosing grapes)
has a positive spillover effect on own grape take-up, while peers’ incentives (seeing peers choose
incentivized grapes) may have positive or negative spillover effects. Armed with this knowledge,
we proceed to tease out the different spillover effects from seeing other children pick grapes or
observing other children picking incentivized grapes.
Since spillovers affect the likelihood that a child may change the card played after seeing
others, our dependent variable is the difference between the final and initial grape choice, ∆G =
G2 − G1. Therefore, we begin our analysis of spillover effects by estimating how exogenously
varying the table proportion incentivized, TP ∈ [0, 1], affects ∆G:
∆Gi = β0 + β1TPi + β2TPi ∗ Pi + β3Ii + β4Pi + β5IiPi + β6Xi + i (6)
We condition on being incentivized (I) and on the public treatment dummy (P ) because they
affect the initial grape choice, which, in turn, affects the likelihood of ending up with grapes. We
add the interaction of I and P because we estimate different parameters for the two treatments.
The results do not change whether we interact by public treatment or not, or whether we estimate
the parameters of equation 6 or of equation G2i = β0 + β1TPi + β2TPi ∗ Pi + f(βIPGIiPiG1i) +
β3Xi + i, where the term f(βIPG1IiPiG1i) is the sum of all the interactions of the incentive
treatment, public treatment, and initial grape choice dummies.16
Children do not observe the variable TP but instead observe the fraction choosing incen-
tivized grapes in the first round. However, this variable is exogenous and under the control of
the policy maker, and thus its impact is of policy relevance. Moreover, it is positively correlated
with the fraction of table mates choosing grapes, which is endogenous.17
The parameter β1 identifies the marginal effect of the proportion of incentivized children
at one’s table in the private treatment, while β2 identifies the difference in the effect of this
proportion between the public and private treatments. β1 and β2 are two separate spillover
effects on one’s own choice: β1 is the reduced-form effect of observing peers’ choices and β2 is
the reduced-form effect of observing whether peers’ choices are incentivized.
Table 6 shows the estimates of our parameters of interest, β1 and β2 from equation (6).
Column 1 shows that a 1 percentage point increase in the proportion incentivized in the private
16In unreported regressions, we replace the table proportion incentivized with the table proportion incentivized
other than self and the results are qualitatively unchanged.
17The correlation coefficient is 0.27.
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treatment increases the likelihood of switching to grapes by 0.09 percentage points (s.e. 0.05). A
positive effect in the private treatment, in which children can observe the food choices of others
but not whether these choices are incentivized, suggests that watching other children pick grapes
has a positive spillover effect on the likelihood of switching to grapes. The second row of estimates
in column 1 shows that the effect of the proportion incentivized changes when the incentives are
public. Relative to private incentives, a 1 percentage point increase in the proportion incentivized
additionally decreases one’s likelihood of switching to grapes by 0.18 percentage points (s.e.
0.08). Therefore, the net spillover effect of public incentives (i.e., the effect from increasing
the table proportion who is incentivized), in the third row, is negative (−0.09 = 0.09 − 0.18;
s.e. 0.06). Overall, in column 1, the spillover effects are of opposite sign, that is, our results
correspond to case 2 from our theory: a positive direct effect of incentives, positive effects of
peer’s actions, and negative effects of peers’ incentive status. This has important implications
for scaling up experiments. In particular, the effects of incentives can be non-monotonic with
respect to the fraction incentivized, meaning that it is particularly challenging to determine the
magnitude but more importantly the sign of the effect of incentives when scaling up.
Non-linearities. The specification highlighted above in equation (6) specifies that the effect of the
proportion incentivized as being linear. We also consider possible non-linearities alternatively
truncating the sample and using a quadratic function of the table proportion incentivized. Both
approaches yield a similar message: non-linearities matter.
First, we restrict the sample to tables with a positive proportion of incentivized children
(column 2) and with at least 50% of incentivized children (column 3), in which case the overall
table proportion incentivized increases from 50% to 66% (column 2) and to 80% (column 3).18
When we do that, we find that the two marginal effects become considerably larger (in absolute
value), especially the negative effect of observing other children’s incentivized choices.
Second, we estimate equation (6) adding the square of the table proportion incentivized and




i ∗Pi. Figure 4 shows the marginal effects
of fraction incentivized from this equation (i.e., estimates of β1 +β2 ∗Pi+2β4TPi+2β5TPi ∗Pi).
If the effects were linear, each of those graphs would depict a horizontal line, which they do
not. The figure confirms that the marginal effects grow of the table proportion incentivized
in absolute level with the proportion incentivized. The marginal effects become statistically
different from zero when 40 to 50 percent of the table is incentivized.
18The sample restrictions in columns 2 and 3 drop approximately the first quartile and the first two quartiles
of the fraction incentivized distribution.
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8 Combining the direct and spillover effects
Recall that the total effect of incentives on the final grape choice is the sum of the net direct
effect on the initial choice, G1, which we found to be positive, and the two spillover effects on
changing snack, ∆G, which we found to be one positive and the other negative. We can now
compare the estimates of the direct and spillover effects from Tables 5 and 6, as well as compute
their sum, which is the total effect of incentives.
The combined evidence of the direct and spillover effects matches our initial findings from
Figure 2. A 1 percentage point increase in the proportion of incentivized children has a direct
effect on the likelihood of choosing grapes of 0.26 percentage points (from Table 5, column 1) and
two spillover effects. First, observing other people choosing grapes in the private treatment has a
positive effect on one’s likelihood of ending up with grapes. A 1 percentage point increase in the
proportion incentivized to pick grapes further increases one’s likelihood of ending up with grapes
by 0.09, 0.12, and 0.16 percentage points when the proportion of children incentivized are 50, 66,
and 80% (table 6), row 1). Therefore, the fraction incentivized that maximizes the likelihood of
ending up with grapes in the private treatment is 100%, as both the direct and spillover effects
of incentives are positive over all ranges of the fraction incentivized. However, the effects of this
treatment are likely to have limited policy relevance because, in many settings, spanning from
conditional cash transfers such as PROGRESA to incentives for student performance (such as
Levitt et al 2011), the knowledge that one’s peers are being incentivized would likely diffuse.
Therefore, the public, rather than the private treatment, is likely to be more realistic in a real
world policy situation.
In the public treatment, besides the positive spillover effect discussed above, observing that
some persons choosing grapes are incentivized has an additional negative effect on the likeli-
hood of ending up with grapes. The corresponding point estimates are -0.18, -0.22, and -0.45
percentage points when the proportion of children incentivized are 50, 66, and 80% (table 6),
row 2).
Using all the aforementioned estimates, we find that a 1 percentage point increase in the pro-
portion incentivized overall increases grapes take-up by 0.17 (0.26+0.09-0.18) and 0.16 (0.26+0.12-
0.22) percentage points when the mean incentivized is 50% and 66%, but reduces grapes take-up
by -0.03 (0.26+0.16-0.45) percentage points when the mean incentivized is 80%. Therefore, while
incentivizing either half or two thirds of children increases grapes take-up in the public treat-
ment, incentivizing 80 percent of children does not increase take-up.
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9 Interpretation
While this paper studies two specific types of spillover effects, spillover effects may occur also
through other mechanisms. This section considers alternative mechanisms and concludes that
they cannot explain the existence of positive and negative spillover effects as we find.
Fairness or Envy. Two mechanisms that could explain the negative spillover effects are fairness
or envy (Feldman & Kirman, 1974; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999). If non-incentivized people felt
unfairly treated because their peers have been incentivized while they have not, or envious of
their incentivized peers, they may be induced to switch from grapes to cookies after observing
their peers’ incentivized choice. However, we observe the largest negative effects of incentives
in tables in which all children are incentivized. Therefore, the children who switch back from
grapes to cookies in these tables cannot feel unfairly treated, because they are being incentivized
to pick grapes too. We conclude that perceived lack of fairness is not a major determinant of
the negative spillover effects we detect.
Social Conformity. A possible mechanism for the positive spillover effects is social conformity,
which occurs if children derive utility from conforming to their peers’ behavior (Sherif, 1937;
Asch, 1958; Goeree & Yariv, 2014; Haun et al. , 2014). Since incentives increase initial grape
take-up, the higher the initial take-up, the more children will want to conform, ending up picking
grapes too.
While conformity cannot explain both the positive and the negative spillover effects, we can
nevertheless test specific aspects of social conformity and see to what extent it affects children’s
behavior. One way to test for conformity is to exploit the data collected on best friends, “popular
kids,” and the table gender composition.19 This test is based on the premise that children want
to conform differently to their best friends, to children they perceive as being popular, and to
children of their own gender, than to other children. One could come up with arguments why
children may want to conform either more or less to these subsets of children. Regardless of the
specific case, the choices of best friends, popular kids, and children of own gender should affect
ones’ choice differently than the effect of the table’s choices as a whole. Conversely, if behaviors
are consistent with our model, then the choices of peers may be equally weighted leaving the
choices of best friends, popular kids, and children of own gender having no additional effect.
To test these hypotheses, we focus on children with at least one best friend (or popular kid, or
child of own gender) sitting at their table. Because of our experiment, whether the best friend
(or popular kid, or child of own gender) is incentivized is random. To measure the spillover
19Children report the names of up to 5 best friends and of the boy and girl they consider most popular.
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effect of social conformity in picking grapes, we estimate the parameters of the spillover effect
equation, equation (6), adding variables for the table proportions of best friends (or popular
kids, or children of own gender) incentivized:20




i Pi + δ5Ii + δ6Pi + δ7IiPi + δ8Xi + i, (7)
where the variable TPBF is the table proportion of incentivized best friends (or popular kids,
or children of own gender), while the other variables are as discussed before.21,22 Under social
conformity of the type described above, the parameter δ3 is different from zero.
To measure the additional spillover effects of social conformity due to picking incentivized
grapes, we further interact the variable TPBF by the child’s incentive status, TPBF ∗ I:
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Under social conformity of the type described above, the parameter θ6 is different from zero.
Table 7 reports the estimates from these regressions, using, alternatively, the entire sample,
only tables with at least one incentivized child, and tables in which at least half the children are
incentivized. This table shows that none of the estimates of the parameters of interest (i.e., δ3
and θ6) is statistically different from zero. We interpret this evidence as being inconsistent with
a theory of social conformity in which the children have preferences for conforming differently
to their best friends, to the children they perceive as being popular, or to children of their own
gender differently than from other children.
To conclude, the data reject the possibility that our results are explained by envy, fairness,
or social conformity of the type described above.
20Before doing that, we checked whether spillover effects vary for children who did not name any best friend
or popular kid, for children who did not fill in the questionnaire, and for children without kids of the same gender
sitting at the table. The effects for these subgroups do not differ statistically from the main effects. So the fact
that we are dropping these children from the regressions may not be as disconcerting.
21For example, if in a table of size 5 there are two child j’s best friends, and one of them is incentivized, for
child j the table proportion of incentivized best friends is 1
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= 0.2.
22The variable TP is the table proportion of incentivized children, which varies from 0 to 100%, and the dummy
variable P equals 1 for the public treatment and 0 for the private treatment, in which the cards are played face
down and, therefore, one can infer other children’s choices from the color of the card, but not whether a child was
incentivized or not, and one for public treatment, in which the cards are played face up and the incentives can
be observed. The X variables are as defined before.
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10 Discussion
This paper studies the spillover effects of incentives when incentives act as signals. To do that,
we designed a unique experiment to decompose these spillover effects into two components: one
due to peers’ actions and the other due to peers’ incentive status. We postulate that peers’
incentive status can have negative spillover effects even if the other two effects are positive,
leading to an overall effect of incentives of indeterminate sign.
We study these effects in one context in which we expect the spillover effects of incentives
to be large: children’s food choices – specifically, grapes v. cookie – during the school lunch.
The direct effects of incentives are large, increasing grapes take-up by about 50%. However, the
spillover effects of incentives are also large, especially the negative effect caused by observing
peers’ incentivized choices. When peer incentives are visible, the positive effect of seeing peers
choose grapes is more then offset by the negative effect of seeing peers incentivized to pick grapes.
The overall effect of incentives (i.e., combining the direct and spillover effects) is positive when
half or two thirds of children are incentivized, but declines beyond that, to the point that take-
up of grapes for the 100% incentivized group is not statistically different from that of the 0%
incentivized group.
Our findings have several implications. First, the possibility of negative spillover effects
that counteract the positive direct effects of incentives should not be overlooked. Since these
negative spillover effects can occur in response to learning about peers’ incentives, it may be
preferable not to make incentives public, when possible, although this may not be feasible in
many settings. Spillover effects of this kind may occur in environments where the value of the
incentivized action is not well-known (e.g., adoption of new technologies or new behaviors),
there is a tradeoff between short-run costs and long-run benefits (e.g., exercise), and pro-social
behaviors are present. Second, separately measuring spillover effects and how these effects vary
with the fraction treated is important for understanding how experimental results may scale-up
when introduced more broadly.
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Online Appendices – Not for Publication
Appendix A: Experimental instructions
We are going to play a choice game where you can win these fun prizes!
(Point to the prizes)
Each of you gets two cards. Keep your cards a secret. You cannot trade cards.
One of your cards will be a cookie card and one of them will be a grape card. The game is
to play one of these cards face up (down) on the table.
If you play a cookie card, you get a cookie. If you play a grape card, you get some grapes.
(Point to grapes and cookies)
After you play your card, you will have 20 seconds to change your mind. You may look at
what your neighbors played. After 20 seconds, you cannot change your choice!
Some of the grape cards might have gold tokens on them. If you get a card with a gold token
on it and you play it, you get a prize with your grapes! Here are the prize choices.
(Point to prize board)
You get your prize at the end of the game.
Ok, let me ask everyone a few questions to make sure we all know how to play.
(Have students say out loud answers, and always correct at the end: either, “Yes, each person
gets 2 cards” or “No, each person gets 2 cards” and “Yes, if you play a grape card you get
grapes’)
1. How many cards does each person get? (answer is 2, one cookie one grape)
2. How many cards can each person play? (answer is 1 only)
3. How do you play a card? (answer is put it on the table)
4. What happens if you play a cookie card? (you get a cookie)
5. What happens if you play a grape card? (you get grapes)
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6. What happens if you play a grape card with a token? (you get grapes plus a prize)
Good job! Let’s play!
Here are your cards. Remember to keep them hidden.
(Wait 10 seconds)
Choose the card you are going to play now. Remember if you play a card you should put it
on the table face UP (DOWN) like this (demonstrate).
(Wait for children to play their cards)
Ok is that your final choice? You can change your mind if you want to.
(Wait exactly 20 seconds)
Ok, the game is over, you can’t change your choice now.
Everyone who played a card with a token on it will get a prize sheet, please fill it out to
claim your prize.
Appendix B: Heterogeneity by child and peer gender and age
This Appendix considers how the effects can differ along several dimensions: i) the type of switch
- to grapes or to cookies, ii) gender and school grade, and iii) table size.
First, recall that the parameter ∆G is the difference between switching from cookie to grapes,
SG, and from grapes to cookie, SC: ∆G = SG − SC. To have a better understanding of how
spillover effects work in our setting, Table B1 considers both the separate choices of switching
from cookies to grapes and from grapes to cookies. We also examine how these effects vary across
incentivized and non-incentivized children. The estimated marginal effects are consistent with
the main results: the likelihood of switching to grapes increases with the proportion choosing
grapes (i.e., β̂1 is positive) and decreases with the proportion choosing incentivized grapes (i.e.,
β̂2 is negative). The opposite is true for the likelihood of switching to cookies. The primary
action is on the dimension of switching to grapes and not switching to cookies, as expected.
We also test whether the effects of incentives differ by gender and age, proxied by school
grade, as has been found in different contexts, as we discuss below. While Table B2 shows that
we do not detect any gender or age difference in the direct effect of incentives, Table B3 show
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that spillover effects vary by gender. Specifically, the positive effects of seeing others choose
grapes is stronger for girls, while the negative effects of seeing the incentivized choices of others
is stronger for boys. When we pool the two effects we find that the overall spillover effect of
incentives is statistically more negative (and grows faster) for boys than for girls. The magnitude
of this difference is large, with the net effect for boys being at least twice as large (in absolute
value) as the effect for girls. This gender differences in the response to incentives has been also
found in other contexts (e.g., Angrist & Lavy (2009); Angrist et al. (2009); Croson & Gneezy
(2009); Dohmen & Falk (2011)). However, this finding is not consistent in the literature (as,
e.g., neither Lacetera et al. (2013) nor Royer et al. (2015) find evidence of gender differences
in the effects of incentives for pro-social or healthful behavior).
In addition, Table B4 show weak evidence that the spillover effects of incentives are stronger
for younger children: the point estimates of the positive and negative spillover effects are closer
to zero for children in above median grades than for younger children. However, the differences
between these two groups are not statistically significant.
Lastly, a priori one might expect that the effects would differ across table size. For example,
there may be less interaction at a larger table. We divide the sample into two - above and below
median table size. We note that table size and proportion incentivized are uncorrelated (the
correlation coefficient is 0.005). There is no systematic difference by table size (results available
upon request).
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Residuals are partialled out from a parametric fit.
Estimates unconditional on the initial choice of grapes.



































Residuals are partialled out from a parametric fit.
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Figure 4: Marginal spillover effects of proportion table incentivized on the conditional likelihood
of ending up with grapes. Estimates from a quadratic version of equation (6)
.
34
Table 1: Direct, Spillover, and Overall Effects of Incentives
Sign of Spillover effect: Sign of Sign of








) spillover effect: overall effect:
Case 1: ∂Bi
∂I
> 0 and direct effect > 0
Signs, case 1: (+) (+×+) + (+×+) = (+) (+)
Case 2: ∂Bi
∂I
< 0 and direct effect > 0
Signs, case 2: (+) (+×+) + (−×+) = (+ or -) (+ or -)
Case 3: ∂Bi
∂I
< 0 and direct effect < 0
Signs, case 3: (-) (+×−) + (−×−) = (+ or -) (+ or -)
Table 2: Table Proportion Incentivized - Distribution by Child Incentive Status
Observations by Child Type:




















Total observations: 807 824
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics by group
Group N. obs Table size % of boys Grade Black Hispanic Free
luncha
Private-0 130 6.23 0.34 3.86 0.39 0.55 0.92
[1.37] [0.48] [2.37] [0.49] [0.5] [0.28]
Public-0 268 6.51 0.47 4.07 0.34 0.58 0.87
[1.53] [0.5] [1.95] [0.47] [0.49] [0.34]
Private-50-no incentive 171 6.66 0.48 4.12 0.45 0.44 0.89
[1.84] [0.5] [2.45] [0.5] [0.5] [0.32]
Private-50-incentive 159 6.74 0.46 4.26 0.38 0.49 0.84
[1.71] [0.5] [2.42] [0.49] [0.5] [0.37]
Public-50-no incentive 238 6.42 0.47 3.68 0.39 0.48 0.83
[1.3] [0.5] [2.58] [0.49] [0.5] [0.38]
Public-50-incentive 206 6.51 0.47 3.69 0.37 0.49 0.85
[1.26] [0.5] [2.66] [0.48] [0.5] [0.36]
Private-100-incentive 288 6.49 0.52 4.27 0.41 0.54 0.9
[1.44] [0.5] [2.28] [0.49] [0.5] [0.31]
Public-100-incentive 171 5.98 0.49 3.83 0.39 0.56 0.89
[1.66] [0.5] [2.6] [0.49] [0.5] [0.31]
Total 1631 6.45 0.47 3.99 0.39 0.52 0.87
[1.52] [0.5] [2.4] [0.49] [0.5] [0.34]
Test of balance across groups
F-test∗ 0.77 0.88 1.66 0.45 0.18 0.36
p-value 0.62 0.53 0.12 0.87 0.99 0.93
Standard deviations reported in brackets.
∗F-test test for joint significance of groups controlling for school-by-period strata.
aChild is eligible for Free/Reduced National School Lunch Program.
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Table 4: Children’s choices across groups
Group N Initial Switching Switching Ending up
grape choice to grape to cookie with grape
Private-0 130 0.646 0.062 0.062 0.646
[0.480] [0.241] [0.241] [0.480]
Public-0 268 0.429 0.104 0.067 0.466
[0.496] [0.306] [0.251] [0.500]
Private-50-no incentive 171 0.485 0.088 0.070 0.503
[0.501] [0.284] [0.256] [0.501]
Private-50-incentive 159 0.792 0.019 0.069 0.742
[0.407] [0.136] [0.255] [0.439]
Public-50-no incentive 238 0.466 0.076 0.059 0.483
[0.500] [0.265] [0.236] [0.501]
Public-50-incentive 206 0.752 0.058 0.073 0.738
[0.433] [0.235] [0.26] [0.441]
Private-100-incentive 288 0.760 0.052 0.052 0.760
[0.428] [0.223] [0.223] [0.428]
Public-100-incentive 171 0.655 0.029 0.105 0.579
[0.477] [0.169] [0.308] [0.495]
Overall 1631 0.616 0.064 0.068 0.612
[0.486] [0.244] [0.252] [0.487]
F-test∗ 14.12 2.51 0.82 10.62
p-value 0.000 0.016 0.571 0.000
F-test∗ (conditional on being incentivized) 1.53 1.46 0.81 1.82
p-value 0.168 0.192 0.562 0.095
Standard deviations reported in brackets.
∗ F-test for joint significance of groups controlling for school-by-period strata, table size, grade,
sex, race and lunch type.
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Table 5: Direct effect of incentives (I) and public treatment (P ) on initial grape choice (G1)
G1i = α0 + α1Ii + α2Xi + i (1)
G1i = λ0 + λ1Ii + λ2Pi + λ3IiPi + λ4Xi + i (2)
Initial choice Initial choice
of grapes of grapes
(1) (2)
Direct effect of incentives (α1 in (1) or λ1 in (2)) 0.259 0.241
[0.031]*** [0.048]***
Difference in incentive effect between public and private treatments (λ3) 0.013
[0.067]
Effect of public treatment for non-incentivized children (λ2) -0.084
[0.048]*
Effect of public treatment for incentivized children (λ2 + λ3) -0.071
[0.051]
Average take-up for non-incentivized children 0.495 0.495
N 1631 1631
***,**,* = significant at the 1,5,10% level. Column (1) depicts OLS estimates of equation (1) listed on table and Column (2) depicts OLS
estimates of equation (2) listed on table. Standard errors are clustered by tables. Regressions control for school-by-period strata, table size,
grade, sex, race and lunch type.
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Table 6: Spillover effects of proportion of table incentivized on switching
∆Gi = β0 + β1TPi + β2TPi ∗ Pi + β3Ii + β4Pi + β5IiPi + β6Xi + i
(1) (2) (3)
All children % of incentivized % of incentivized
children > 0% children ≥ 50%
Spillover effect of peers choosing grapes
Effect of table proportion incentivized (β1) 0.093 0.125 0.163
[0.049]* [0.066]* [0.08]**
Spillover effect of peers choosing incentivized grapes
Effect of table proportion incentivized∗public (β2) -0.183 -0.223 -0.454
[0.08]** [0.107]** [0.127]***
Total spillover effect
Effect of table proportion incentivized for public (β1 + β2) -0.091 -0.098 -0.291
[0.06] [0.08] [0.101]***
Average proportion of table incentivized 0.505 0.668 0.802
***,**,* = significant at the 1,5,10% level. OLS estimates control for school-by-period strata, table size, grade, sex, race and
lunch type. Standard errors are clustered by table.
Table 7: Testing for conformity in the proportion of incentivized children
(1) (2) (3)
All kids % of incentivized % of incentivized
children > 0% children ≥ 50%
Panel A: Effect of same-gender incentivized kids
Spillover effect of peers choosing grapes
Effect of table proportion incentivized (δ3) 0.061 0.123 0.054
[0.137] [0.136] [0.154]
Spillover effect of peers choosing incentivized grapes
Effect of table proportion of group incentivized*incentive*public (θ6) -0.047 0.013 -0.126
[0.219] [0.218] [0.24]
Number of observations 1549 1163 825
Panel B: Effect of incentivized best friends
Spillover effect of peers choosing grapes
Effect of table proportion incentivized (δ3) 0.041 0.037 -0.163
[0.077] [0.079] [0.111]
Spillover effect of peers choosing incentivized grapes
Effect of table proportion of group incentivized*incentive*public (θ6) 0.27 0.29 0.157
[0.161] [0.163] [0.17]
Number of observations 1631 1233 872
Panel C: Effect of incentivized popular kids
Spillover effect of peers choosing grapes
Effect of table proportion incentivized (δ3) -0.029 -0.041 0.015
[0.091] [0.095] [0.093]
Spillover effect of peers choosing incentivized grapes
Effect of table proportion of group incentivized*incentive*public (θ6) 0.085 0.077 0.27
[0.169] [0.168] [0.144]
Number of observations 1631 1233 872
***,**,* = significant at the 1,5,10% level. We report the estimates of the estimates of δ3 and θ6 from the following equations: ∆Gi =









i Pi + θ5TP
BF
i Ii + θ6TP
BF
i IiPi + θ7Ii + θ8Pi + θ9IiPi + θ10Xi + i. OLS estimates control for school-by-period strata, table size,


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table B2: Heterogeneity in the direct effects of incentives on initial grape choice, by gender and
grade
Initial grape choice Initial grape choice




Incentive*above median grade -0.045
[0.062]
Control group mean 0.495 0.495
N 1631 1631
***,**,* = significant at the 1,5,10% level. OLS estimates control for school-by-period strata, table size, grade,
sex, race and lunch type. Standard errors are clustered by table. Column (1) estimates also include a dummy for
male and column (2) estimates include a dummy for grades above the median grade.
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Table B3: Heterogeneity in spillover effect of proportion of table incentivized on switching to
grapes, by gender
∆Gi = η0 + η1TPi + η2TPiPi + η3TPimalei + η4TPiPimalei + η5malei + η6Ii + η7Pi + η8IiPi + η9Xi + i
(1) (2) (3)
All children % of incentivized % of incentivized
children >0% children ≥ 50%
Spillover effect of peers choosing grapes
Effect of table proportion incentivized (η1) 0.174 0.252 0.279
[0.077]** [0.104]** [0.123]**
Effect of table proportion incentivized*male (η3) -0.143 -0.232 -0.241
[0.104] [0.118]* [0.149]
Spillover effect of peers choosing incentivized grapes
Effect of table proportion incentivized*public (η2) -0.226 -0.217 -0.367
[0.117]* [0.154] [0.168]**
Effect of table proportion incentivized*public*male (η4) 0.08 -0.028 -0.13
[0.148] [0.178] [0.245]
Total spillover effect
Effect of table proportion incentivized for public (η1 + η2) -0.052 0.034 -0.088
[0.084] [0.114] [0.121]
Effect of table proportion incentivized for public male (η3 + η4) -0.063 -0.26 -0.371
[0.106] [0.135]* [0.195]*
Average proportion table incentivized 0.505 0.668 0.802
***,**,* = significant at the 1,5,10% level. OLS estimates control for school-by-period strata, table size, grade, sex, race and lunch type.
Standard errors are clustered by table.
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Table B4: Heterogeneity in spillover effect of proportion of table incentivized on switching to
grapes, by grade
∆Gi = η0 + η1TPi + η2TPiPi + η3TPigi + η4TPiPigi + η5gi + η6Ii + η7Pi + η8IiPi + η9Xi + i
(1) (2) (3)
All children % of incentivized % of incentivized
children >0% children ≥50%
Spillover effect of peers choosing grapes
Effect of table proportion incentivized (η1) 0.169 0.195 0.188
[0.069]** [0.102]* [0.135]
Effect of table proportion incentivized*above median grade (η3) -0.135 -0.139 -0.07
[0.098] [0.134] [0.155]
Spillover effect of peers choosing incentivized grapes
Effect of table proportion incentivized*public (η2) -0.245 -0.377 -0.538
[0.107]** [0.147]** [0.195]***
Effect of table proportion incentivized*public*above median grade (η4) 0.121 0.339 0.233
[0.162] [0.21] [0.265]
Total spillover effect
Effect of table proportion incentivized for public (η1 + η2) -0.076 -0.182 -0.351
[0.077] [0.108]* [0.143]**
Effect of table proportion incentivized for public above median grade -0.014 0.200 0.163
(η3 + η4) [0.122] [0.165] [0.208]
Average proportion of table incentivized 0.505 0.668 0.802
***,**,* = significant at the 1,5,10% level. gi is a dummy variable equal to 1 if above median grade and 0 otherwise. OLS estimates control
for school-by-period strata, table size, grade, sex, race and lunch type. Standard errors are clustered by table.
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